A Response to Don Marquis’s “Why Abortion is Immoral”
December 26, 2022
This is an objection to Don Marquis’s paper “Why Abortion is Immoral.” I highly recommend reading the full original paper, or a brief summary of it prior to this response. It should be noted that Marquis’s paper is highly regarded within the philosophy community. Most arguments for why abortion is immoral are religious, and many appreciate how Marquis’s view is secular. Typically pro-choice arguments are along the lines of “a fetus is not a person and so abortion is not murder” and pro-life arguments will often claim the exact opposite: “a fetus is a person and so abortion is murder.” Of course, the arguments are far more flushed out and examine marginal cases, but they follow these general formulas. Marquis’s argument is especially effective because he concedes that a fetus is not strictly a person, yet continues to argue against abortion. In the future, I would also like to discuss and respond to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous “A Defense of Abortion,” who, like Marquis, concedes the opposition's point (in her case that a fetus is indeed a person) before presenting a unique argument.
Don Marquis, an American philosopher, is most well known for his writing defending the immorality of abortion. Marquis’s argument, commonly known as the future-like-ours argument, is that abortion, and for that matter murder in general, is wrong because it deprives future human life. His argument is very utilitarian in nature, as it focuses on future consequences to determine the morality of abortion. It is also important to note that Marquis does not believe abstinence or contraceptives are immoral, as he says the deprivation of theoretical future life is by no means comparable to the deprivation of the future life of a fetus already in existence. The following discussion is my argument refuting Marquis’s view. I reject his argument on two behalfs, the first regarding his committed position on certain cases, and the second regarding the arbitrary line he draws to determine when the potential for a “future-like-ours” begins.
Marquis acknowledges that in some cases, abortion may be morally justified, however, he fails to defend what cases these are, or what certain qualities of these cases allow them to overcome his original argument. It seems that his position, that abortion is wrong due to the deprivation of future life, is incompatible with permitting abortion in the circumstances of rape, as there is still a fetus with a potential future life involved. Additionally, it seems that in the situation where either the mother or fetus will die in childbirth, Marquis must favor the fetus. The fetus seemingly possesses more potential life than the mother strictly based on age, but it seems absurd not to favor the mother’s life in these scenarios, and indeed, it is common practice to abort the baby if the mother’s life is threatened. Marquis may argue against this, saying that if abortion is to be akin to murder, and murder is permitted in some circumstances, then it follows that abortion is occasionally permitted as well. This may be a defensible point, but Marquis does not defend it. He provides no reasoning as to why these two situations should allow abortion while maintaining that it is immoral in normal circumstances.
The second objection I have to Marquis’s argument is that the line he draws on when the potential for a “future-like-ours” begins is ultimately arbitrary. A typical objection to Marquis’s view is that his position deems contraception immoral, as it denies the potential for future human life. Indeed he agrees that if his position necessitates the immorality of contraception something in his argument must be flawed. He says however that contraception only prevents the possibility of potential future human life. In contrast, abortion eliminates potential future human life already in existence, and so he says his position is compatible with allowing contraception. I believe this response to be inadequate. Marquis gives four candidates for the subject of harm by contraception: “(1) some sperm of other, (2) some ovum or other, (3) a sperm and an ovum separately, and (4) a sperm and an ovum together” (Marquis). He denies the legitimacy of harm to future human life for these possible candidates separately, and while I would like to object to all four of his defenses, for the sake of time and length, I will only object to his defense of candidate (4): a sperm and ovum together. His defense is as follows:
“At the time of contraception, there are hundreds of millions of sperm, one (released) ovum and millions of possible combinations of all of these. There is no actual combination at all. Is the subject of the loss to be a merely possible combination? Which one? This alternative does not yield an actual subject of harm either. Accordingly, the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future-like-ours argument simply because there is no nonarbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception” (Marquis).
This defense is inadequate. Just because there is no nonarbitrary subject of the loss of a future-like-ours in the case of contraception, does not mean a loss does not occur. For example, imagine this morbid take on sleeping beauty. Sleeping beauty is asleep in a tower and will die soon. But, if she receives a kiss she will wake up and live her life with her new love. At the same time, there are a million possible princes (or princesses, it's 2022 after all) outside her tower fighting for the privilege to kiss her. It happens that any prince who is not the one to kiss sleeping beauty will die within a few hours. Using contraception is like putting a wall between the princes and sleeping beauty in her tower. Sleeping beauty and all the possible princes will die if this wall is put up, but without the barrier, one prince and sleeping beauty will live. It is unclear which prince will be successful, nor is it guaranteed that there will be one who is. But there is a possibility that one prince will reach the top and ensure sleeping beauty and their own future lives. Marquis argues that because it is unclear which prince will kiss sleeping beauty and have a future life is not immoral to put up the barrier. I believe this stance is incompatible with Marquis’s original position deeming abortion immoral. Surely the possibility of one prince being successful is better than guaranteeing none are. The lack of a clear subject which would be deprived of a future life (in this case one of millions of sperm-egg combinations) does not provide an adequate distinction between abortion and contraception. This sleeping beauty example shows that this line Marquis draws for what holds a future-like-ours is truly arbitrary, and it is possible that a sperm and egg, should also be considered a potential human by Marquis’s argument.