Formal Essay: A Virtue Ethics Refutation of Adaptive Preferences
December 14, 2022
Introduction
From birth, societal and cultural influences largely determine one’s sentiments. To some degree, all preferences stem from one's position in, and perspective of, reality. Because the scale by which one measures his or her well-being distorts under subconscious influence, these adaptive preferences often unreliably reflect what is truly of benefit to a person. How then, to determine if a given preference is genuinely in one's interest? The discussion that follows demonstrates how virtue ethics provides a method by which to measure the value of an adaptive preference and its fulfillment. In short, those preferences which manifest as vice must not serve to improve well-being, and in the antithetical sense, those which show virtue must promote the same.
What is an Adaptive Preference?
Adaptive preferences are desires that have unconsciously developed due to one’s environmental influences. They are neither categorically good nor bad. Rather, those adaptive preferences that reflect the desires of the virtuous person may be morally justified, and those which reflect the desires of the vicious person must not be. Following is a case worth distinction that Hugh Breakey calls the Sour Grapes Irrationality. It shows a consciously made preferential adjustment and as such is an example of a nonadaptive preference. In one of Aesop's fables a thirsty fox desires grapes from a tree. Upon not being able to reach the fruit he scoffs and claims he did not want the “sour grapes” anyway. In essence: I cannot have x, thus x is undesirable.
This is a form of irrationality of belief formation; if it is an indispensable property of beliefs that they aim at truth, then the fox is being irrational and self-deceiving by coming to form a belief on the basis of reasons that have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of that belief. If Hellenistic Adaptation is the changing of our preferences to cohere with the demands of reality as we understand it, then Sour Grapes irrationality is the changing of our understanding of reality in order to cohere with our preferences ( Breakey).
Self-deception constitutes a consciously made change in desire and is therefore not an adaptive preference. It should be noted that virtue ethics does not hold conscious changes in sentiment as categorically bad. The same method by which the goodness of a preference is evaluated may be employed for both those consciously made and unconsciously developed. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus only on true adaptive preferences as previously defined.
So, what adaptive preferences can be seen? Some of the clearest examples are found in groups historically occupying positions of societal subjugation. Recorded accounts from American colonial slaves reflect a perception of satisfaction in enslavement and indeed show a sentiment that Black people are intrinsically inferior to White people. This is clearly irrational, yet by the nature of prolonged enslavement, reality distorts to such a degree that this adaptive development nonetheless occurs. Additionally, our preferences concerning sound, taste, and beauty are a result of norms and influence. Cultures perceive different foods as tasty, types of music as euphonic, and art styles as beautiful. These are other examples of adaptive preferences because, like those of the slave, these sentiments have developed unconsciously.
Problems with Subjective Welfare and the Appeal of Virtues
On the surface, it seems beneficial to one's well-being to have and fulfill desires. Human psychology tells us that one's preferences, excluding evolutionary instinct, are the result of environmental influence. Because everyone’s environment is largely unique, each individual’s desires and welfare are fully subjective, however, it is not necessary that one’s preferences are in their interest. In this way, the concept of subjective welfare is highly problematic. Because an individual is not conscious of their adaptive preferences, realizing any desire will facilitate the feeling of increased well-being. But, the feeling of well-being does not guarantee well-being in itself. Virtue ethics provides an effective method to describe why an adaptive preference antagonizes one's well-being in some circumstances while being beneficial in others, but it is first important to understand what virtue ethics finds morally relevant.
(Virtue ethics) may, initially, be identified as the (normative ethical theory) that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent (Hursthouse).
To evaluate an adaptive preference one must first establish those virtues and vices relevant to the given scenario. Notably, those virtues applicable to any circumstance vary greatly. One may criticize that this aspect allows virtue ethics to permit any preference by manipulation of which virtues are deemed relevant. On the contrary, that only certain virtues are applicable is a key advantage of virtue ethics as it allows a certain flexibility in determining the morality of a preference depending on an individual’s specific situation. Once relevant virtues are established, one must determine whether a given adaptive preference demonstrates these virtues, or instead shows viciousness. Those adaptive preferences which exemplify virtue must promote well-being, and those which demonstrate vice must only serve to oppose the same. Recall the example of a slave who feels content with his position of subjugation. Virtues relevant to this situation include wisdom and justice. Because the slave's preference does not demonstrate these character traits, the preference cannot be good. In comparison, other ethical frameworks such as utilitarianism, fail to determine why the slave’s desire (and its fulfillment) is harmful. Because the slave is content in his or her subjugation, the utilitarian cannot find any immorality in this preference. Notably, virtue ethics does not find all adaptive preferences morally bad. Globally, the desire to find fiscal success and satisfaction in one's life is nearly universal. This is quickly reflected in children at a young age as their preferences unconsciously conform to this societal belief. Ambition and the desire for accomplishment (at least in moderation) is a virtue, and so the virtue ethicist regards this adaptive preference as morally good.
Feminist view
Martha Nussbaum, a notable American philosopher, discusses adaptive preferences through a feminist lens. She also argues against subjective welfarism, saying that it “makes it impossible to conduct a radical critique of unjust institutions” (Nussbaum). The primary “institution” of her concern is the societal subjection of women. Historically, the ideal woman has been submissive and deferential to men, and while many developed nations have made progress in dissolving this archaic norm, women continue to occupy positions of lesser autonomy and authority than their male counterparts. To a more extreme extent, women in many third-world countries endure fabricated religious and political inferiority. While some women oppose this, the predominant sentiment is that of acceptance of one's place in society. These women’s reality and (as a result) their preferences have been distorted to such a degree that their concept of flourishing conflicts with what constitutes true well-being (Bruckner). This can be seen through a virtue ethics-based evaluation. The virtues relevant to this preference are similar to that of the slave, those being wisdom and justice. The desire to occupy a position of societal inferiority certainly does not demonstrate these virtues. Instead, this adaptive preference shows ignorance regarding one's own well-being, and because this does not reflect the desire of the virtuous person, this preference cannot be morally justified. It is important to realize that due to the unconscious nature of an adaptive preference, any individual woman may be unaware that their desire demonstrates vice, but vice is nonetheless present and the desire, therefore, cannot be good.
Objections and Responses
A common objection to the view presented herein is that those preferences which demonstrate virtue are far from universal. As an example, picture two societies, one whose norms dictate that male infants should be circumcised, and the other which believes they should not. How can virtue ethics account for two incompatible preferences (neither of which demonstrates vice) while maintaining its objective appeal? It is a common misconception that any given action or preference must universally be either virtuous or vicious. Virtues are character traits, and two opposite sentiments can both demonstrate the same character trait given opposite environments. An understanding of context shows that the aforementioned societies' views, while at odds, may equally demonstrate the preference of the virtuous person.
One may still argue, yet, that subjective influence has infiltrated the virtue ethicist diagnosis of adaptive preferences. Who am I to say what constitutes virtue and vice? Who am I to say that the virtuous person experiences greater well-being? Who am I even to denounce how another culture subjugates a community if that community accepts it? It seems as if the existence of virtues lacks justification and authority. I, like most virtue ethicists, hold that virtues and vice exist independently from human arbitration. While understanding the action of the virtuous person may seem to be a result of subjective influence, in reality, this knowledge results from practical moral wisdom. This is the Aristotelian concept that virtue is an excellence of character and such excellence of character is obtained only as the result of consistent effort (Liao 228). Moral wisdom is developed through practical experience and provides the foundation of credibility for any claim regarding virtue and vice.
With this understanding, one may still object to the vagueness of well-being and non-applicability of virtue ethics in marginal cases. I do not oppose this. There are situations in which what is good and bad for an individual seems obvious, but uncertainty persists on the continuum between these points. This by no means renders well-being arbitrary. To use a famous analogy, the stages of hair regression make it very difficult to say precisely when a person becomes bald, but despite the vagueness of this line, baldness still certainly exists. Whether a preference promotes or opposes well-being in marginal cases may be unclear, but this only shows a lack of sufficient moral wisdom on which to base a judgment, not that goodness of the preference lacks objectivity. Additionally, it seems the definition of an adaptive preference is unclear in itself. Consider the case of immense situational change. Imagine a young student struggling to stay financially afloat. He eats only microwaved ramen while rallying for universal healthcare and other socialistic policies. Suddenly, he wins the lottery. He now eats steak, drinks wine, and complains about taxes and handouts to the needy. Recall that adaptive preferences are sentiments that unconsciously adapt to the circumstances one finds themselves in, but this is an example of preferences adapting to finding oneself in new circumstances. The latter implies two sets of circumstances, old and new, while the former implies only a singular circumstantial existence. While Hugh Breakly’s Sour Grapes Irrationality shows a conscious change in preference due to a change in one's understanding of reality, this situation shows a change in preference due to an actual change in reality. The difficulty is that it is unclear whether the student's preference has adjusted consciously or unconsciously as a result of his newfound circumstances. Similarly, imagine a young writer moving to New York City from rural California. The colder weather and busy atmosphere are far from what she is used to, or what she seems to enjoy. Over time, however, she comes to love NYC for the very reasons she originally hated it. Is this self-deception, or an unconscious development? It is difficult to say. In marginal cases like these, I do not deny that the definition of an adaptive preference is unclear, however as mentioned, virtue ethics may evaluate adaptive and conscious preferences in the same manner, so in practical application, this issue is resolved.
A more substantial objection to my stance on adaptive preferences is that, in some dilemmas, the virtuous person must be forced to demonstrate vice. Take this real-world example. A very ill boy is rushed to the hospital. The doctor informs the parents that the boy will live provided he promptly receives a blood transfusion. The parents are appalled. They scream and claw as security holds them back. They are Jehovah's Witnesses, and their religious beliefs tell them that if their son receives a blood transfusion, he is certain to go to Hell. The principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses have integrated into the parents' values to such a degree that they would rather let their child die now with the possibility of Heaven than ensure his damnation by having him receive blood. It is once again unclear whether this preference is consciously or unconsciously developed, but in either case, here, virtue ethics seems to be at a loss. The choice to save the boy shows commitment to one's duty as a doctor and compassion for the child's life, yet, it also shows an insensitivity to the family's religion. It certainly does not show virtue to ignore another’s faith, however, it also must not show virtue to let a child die when he may be saved. As such, it is unclear to the virtue ethicist whether the parents’ preference is morally acceptable. In an antithetical case, a situation may require a choice in which two virtues are mutually exclusive. Honesty and Kindness, for example, are both virtues, but there are situations in which demonstrating one necessitates the abandoning of the other, such as a white lie. This critique, while problematic, does not fully undermine my position, as while no singular choice may be fully virtuous, there is certainly a choice that demonstrates greater virtue. Which choice this is only becomes clear only through practical moral wisdom.
Conclusion
People’s preferences are largely a result of environmental influence and are not always in their best interest. The disturbing implications of the issue of adaptive preferences are largely solved by the evaluative method virtue ethics provides. The virtue ethicist believes that the morally right desire is one that the virtuous person would hold.
References
Breakey, Hugh (2010). Adaptive Preferences and the Hellenistic Insight. Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 12 (1):29-39.
Bruckner, D.W. In defense of adaptive preferences. Philos Stud 142, 307–324 (2009). doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9188-7
Hursthouse, Rosalind and Glen Pettigrove. Virtue Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition) ISSN: 1095-5054
Liao, Shenbai (2011). The Subjectivity and Universality of Virtues—An Investigation Based on Confucius’ and Aristotle’s Views. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):217-238.
Nussbaum Martha C. 2001b, ‘Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options’, Economics and Philosophy 17(1): 67–88.